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Preface
Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray and I survey the prospects of a
new global financial crisis being triggered by events in Europe or
the United States and suggest a number of ways a fresh disaster
might be averted.
Beginning with the troubles in Euroland, we argue that the
common diagnosis of a “sovereign debt crisis” obscures more
than it explains. This diagnosis ignores the crucial role of rising
private debt loads and the significance of current account imbal-
ances within the eurozone. The economic crisis itself is largely
to blame for the rise in public debt ratios experienced by most
eurozone nations—precrisis, only two had public debt ratios that
significantly exceeded the Maastricht limit. Profligate spending in
the periphery is not at the root of the problem, and austerity, as
we demonstrate, will not solve it. If a nation like Greece tries to
reduce its public debt load through austerity, it will only be able
to blunt the ensuing collapse in economic growth and worsening
of the private debt problem if it can reduce its current account
deficit. But this requires that surplus countries like Germany
change their policies. Pushing austerity in the periphery while
ignoring these imbalances is a recipe for deflationary disaster.
The European Monetary Union (EMU), as we and others
have long pointed out, was flawed from the start. Members
became users of an external currency without setting up central
fiscal or monetary policy bodies capable of kick-starting growth
or backstopping member-state debt. The EMU is like a United
States without a Washington. After surveying some of the poten-
tial solutions that have been discussed, we offer our own road
map through this crisis, one  that involves addressing the flawed
setup of the EMU.
Turning to the United States, we find a shaky financial sys-
tem that is unlikely to withstand the pressures created by a finan-
cial collapse in the eurozone. Even without a full-blown financial
crisis in Euroland, the health of the US financial system is sus-
pect. We lay out the reasons to believe that many of the biggest
US banks are already insolvent. They have not fully recovered
from the last crisis and their weaknesses are papered over by a
policy of “extend and pretend.” Turbulence can be expected from
numerous directions, from a struggling real economy, with its
sluggish labor market, to the still-weak housing market, the
inevitable deflation of the commodities bubble, and the grow-
ing number of securities fraud cases faced by banks. Although
the spark for the next financial firestorm looks likely to come
from  Europe,  it  may  instead  originate  from  problems  at
America’s biggest banks. We discuss what we need to do to
rebuild the US economy and its financial structure, addressing
the jobs situation, household debt relief, and how to shore up
the brittle banking system.
We conclude with the situation in Greece, at the center of
the eurozone storm. The various rescue packages on offer will
not ultimately solve the problem for Greece. A default is a very
real possibility. Inspired by neoliberal doctrine, the crisis is being
used as a pretext for privatization and a rollback of social legis-
lation, while harsh austerity measures are having devastating
consequences in terms of unemployment, poverty, and fraying of
the social fabric. If a new approach is not embraced, we are likely
seeing the end of the EMU as it currently stands. The conse-
quences of a breakup would ripple through all EMU countries,
and may ultimately trigger the next global financial crisis. The
future of the eurozone could break in one of two directions, with
nations leaving the euro in a coordinated dissolution or, far more
desirable, a major restructuring of the EMU, featuring increased
consolidation and a mechanism for dealing with the effects of
competitive imbalances within the eurozone.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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Introduction
The crisis in Europe has spread from Greece to Spain, Italy, and
beyond, with the impending fallout threatening to jump the
pond and strike the United States’ already shaky financial sys-
tem. Failure to understand the nature of this crisis (willful or
otherwise) and a lack of political consensus around real solu-
tions mean we may be witnessing the end of the euro project in
its present form. The latest plan for the European Monetary
Union (EMU)—the latest in a long line of such inadequate “solu-
tions”—is a new fiscal compact with more automatic penalties
for violators of strict budget limits. This is the wrong solution
for the wrong crisis. As we will demonstrate, it is a misunder-
standing to regard the problems in the eurozone as primarily a
“sovereign debt crisis,” and a mistake to lay the blame at the feet
of government profligacy (Mediterranean or otherwise). The
problem, rather, is the very setup of the EMU.
The looming crack-up of the EMU will be just the begin-
ning. If sovereign debt goes bad, all the major European banks
will be hit—and so will the $3 trillion held in US money market
mutual funds (MMMFs), which have about half their funds
invested in European banks. Add in other US bank exposure to
Europe and you have a potential $3 trillion hit to US finance.
That probably explains why the United States has suddenly taken
a keen interest in Euroland, with the Fed ramping up lending to
European financial institutions and attempting, in a coordinated
effort with five other central banks, to improve liquidity in the
market and bring down interest rates. Critics of this latter move
point out that, despite the temporary infusion of cash into a sys-
tem on the brink, the temporary fix will fail to address investors’
loss of confidence in the ability of Greece, Portugal, Italy, and
Spain to pay back longer-term loans.
Even without a complete collapse in the eurozone, the US
financial system remains vulnerable: financial headwinds are
poised to hit the United States directly. Commodities prices have
finally begun their inevitable downward trajectory, as the biggest
speculative bubble in human history loses air. The US real estate
sector heads toward spring with no end to its crisis in sight. The big
banks are increasingly losing the cases brought against them for
securities fraud, paying big in both fines and settlements. They are
even beginning to lose in foreclosure cases, and since the vast
majority of mortgages made since 2000 involved some kind of
fraud (if not lender fraud, then at least property recording fraud
perpetrated by the industry’s monster, the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System), there could be big losses there, too. Since
there are reasons to believe that many US banks are already insol-
vent, it will not take much to spark another financial crisis.
We first summarize the situation in Europe. We then turn to
US problems, assessing the probability of a return to financial cri-
sis and recession. We conclude that difficult times lay ahead, with a
high probability that another collapse will be triggered by events in
Europe or in the United States. Finally, we provide an assessment of
possible ways out. Although adequate policy solutions abound,
political obstacles on both sides of the pond may mean that real
reform will have to wait until after the next global meltdown.
Austerity in Euroland
It is becoming increasingly clear that European authorities are
merely trying to buy time to figure out how they can save the
financial system against a cascade of likely sovereign defaults.
Meanwhile, they demand more blood in the form of periphery
austerity, which will only increase the eventual costs of the
bailout while stoking North-South hostility. Presumably, leaders
like German Chancellor Angela Merkel are throwing red meat 
to their constituent base for domestic political reasons. If the
EMU is eventually saved, the rancor will make it very difficult to
mend fences.
There is no alternative to debt relief for Greece and other
periphery nations. Even Chancellor Merkel reportedly told her
parliamentarians that she could not exclude the possibility of a
Greek default (Peel 2011). She has also said that all of her eco-
nomic advisers recommend debt relief for Greece, but insists that
debt relief just encourages other highly indebted nations to
demand similar treatment. Thus, she prefers to demand auster-
ity, and if that forces default, so be it.
In other words, Europe’s leaders believe debt relief must be
tied to painful austerity. Remarkably, even as leaders were putting
together yet another rescue package, the European Parliament,
the principal law-making body of the European Union (EU),
voted to make sanctions more automatic for countries that
exceed Maastricht criteria for debts and deficits. Previously,
although penalties were threatened, they were never actually
imposed. Karel Lannoo, chief executive officer of the Centre for
European Policy Studies in Brussels, stressed that the purpose of
the new system is “to show Germany that economic governance
is being improved and to help overcome German concerns about
insufficient accountability in this area at the European level”
(Stearns 2011). Amusingly, only four of the 27 EU nations meetLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
the Maastricht deficit criteria: Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and
Luxembourg. Even Germany will have to pay the fines! It was
Germany that originally got the rules relaxed when its own slow
growth period caused it to chronically exceed Maastricht limits
on deficits and debts. And it is all the more ironic that loosening
the rules allowed Greece to build to the higher debt ratios that
Germany now admonishes (Liu 2011).
The picture of the debtors that the Germans, especially, want
to paint is one of profligate consumption and runaway govern-
ment spending by Mediterraneans. From this perspective, the
only solution is to tighten the screws. As Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble put it, “The main reason for the lack of
demand is the lack of confidence; the main reason for the lack of
confidence is the deficits and public debts which are seen as
unsustainable. . . . We won’t come to grips with economies
deleveraging by having governments and central banks throw-
ing—literally—even more money at the problem. You simply
cannot fight fire with fire” (Giles 2011). In other words, you have
to fight the headwinds with more growth-killing glacial ice.
A leaked letter from former European Central Bank (ECB)
President Jean-Claude Trichet demanded that Italy move more
quickly to a balanced budget (Reuters 2011). It also urged adop-
tion of the neoliberal’s favorite package of policies, including “full
liberalization of local public services,” “a thorough review of the
rules regulating the hiring and dismissal of employees,” “admin-
istrative efficiency,” and “structural reforms.” Following Rahm
Emanuel’s advice, the EU’s neoliberals are using the crisis not only
to impose austerity but also to roll back social legislation, while pri-
vatizing as much of the economy as possible. For this purpose, it is
extremely important that these neoliberals shift the focus away
from problems with the private sector (especially with the excesses
perpetrated by financial institutions that created the global finan-
cial crisis) and on to government’s supposed profligacy and “cod-
dling” of the population (in the form of decent social legislation).
Meanwhile, the doctrine of expansionary austerity continues
to fall on its face. Ireland, the poster child of austerity, has been
hailed as a success story, an exemplar of the miracle of growth
through fiscal contraction. But the reality does not match the acco-
lades. Ireland’s GDP fell 1.9 percent in the third quarter of 2011—
one of the worst performances in the eurozone (Chu 2011).
The Real Nature of the Eurozone Mess
While the story of fiscal excess is a stretch even in the case of
Greece, it certainly cannot apply to Ireland and Iceland, or even
to Spain. In the former cases, these nations adopted the neolib-
eral attitude toward banks that was pushed by policymakers in
Europe and America, with disastrous results. The banks blew up
in a speculative fever and then expected their governments to
absorb all the losses. 
Further, as Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2011) argues, even
Greece’s total outstanding debt (private plus sovereign) is not
high: 250 percent of GDP (versus nearly 500 percent in the US).
Spain’s government debt ratio is just 65 percent of GDP. And
while it is true that Italy’s government debt ratio is high, its
household debt ratio is very low by Western standards. 
Figure 1 presents net debt as a percentage of GDP for a
number of EMU nations. It is obvious that for most of them, the
Figure 1 Net Debt as a Percentage of GDP
Sources: International Monetary Fund; European Central Bank (via Rebecca Wilder)
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economic crisis itself caused significant growth of government
debt ratios. Before the crisis, only Greece and Italy significantly
exceeded the Maastricht limit of 60 percent of GDP. However, all
of them had private sector debt ratios above 100 percent by the
time the crisis hit—and half had ratios above 200 percent. To
label this a sovereign debt crisis is rather strange. Remarkably,
Italy and Greece have the lowest private debt ratios, which is not
consistent with the view that consumers in those nations are
profligate. As we discuss below, it is not surprising that these two
nations have this combination of relatively high government
debt ratios and low private debt ratios, since these are related
through the “three sectors identity” (see below). But the figure
does cast some doubt on the favored story about sovereign
excesses in the periphery. 
If you take the West as a whole, what you find is that over the
past 40 years there has been a long-term upward growth trend of
debt relative to GDP, from just under 140 percent of GDP in 1980
to almost 320 percent today. It is true that government has con-
tributed to that, growing from some 40 percent of GDP to about
90 percent—a doubling to be sure. But the private sector’s debt
ratio grew from a bit over 100 percent to somewhere around 230
percent of GDP. 
In sum, to label this a sovereign debt problem is quite mis-
leading. The dynamics are surely complex, but it is clear that
there is something that is driving debt growth in the developed
world that cannot be reduced to runaway government budget
deficits. Nor does it make sense to point fingers at Mediterraneans,
since it is (largely) the English-speaking world of the United
States, UK, Canada, and Australia that has seen some of the
biggest increases in household debt. The total US debt ratio is
500 percent of GDP, of which household debt alone is 100 per-
cent (and financial institution debt another 125 percent). 
Briefly, part of this phenomenon involves what Hyman P.
Minsky called “money manager capitalism”: a large increase in
financial assets (the flip side of the debt) under professional
management. The long postwar boom helped to build up pen-
sion funds and other financial wealth seeking high returns. That
led to pressure to open up the globe to financial capital flows,
and that in turn generated a series of bubbles and busts across
economies, from the developing world, to Asia, to the United
States, and, finally, to Europe. At the same time, it generated
record inequality and to the extension of what many call “finan-
cialization” to every walk of life. Growing financial wealth is the
sunny side of money manager capitalism, but the dark side is
defined by growing debt and inequality.
The obsessive focus on sovereign debt and austerity also
betrays a lack of understanding of the current account imbal-
ances that plague the eurozone. There is a nearly unacknowl-
edged (except around the Levy Institute) Godleyan identity that
shows the ex post relations (without necessarily saying anything
about the complex endogenous dynamics): the domestic private
balance equals the sum of the domestic government balance less
the external balance. To put it succinctly, if a nation runs a cur-
rent account deficit, then its domestic private balance (house-
holds plus firms) equals its government balance less that current
account deficit. To make this more concrete, when the United
States runs a current account deficit of 5 percent of GDP and a
budget deficit of 10 percent of GDP, its domestic sector has a sur-
plus of 5 percent; or, if its current account deficit is 8 percent of
GDP and its budget deficit is 3 percent, then the private sector
must have a deficit of 5 percent, running up its debt. 
A big reason why much of the developed world has seen its
outstanding private and public sector debts grow relative to GDP
is because we have witnessed the rise of current account surpluses
in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (and others, especially in
Southeast Asia), matched by current account deficits in developed
Western nations as a whole. Hence, developed country budget
deficits have widened even as their private sector debts have grown.
By itself, this is neither good nor bad. But over time, the debt ratios
and hence debt service commitments of Western domestic private
sectors became too large to service out of income flows. This was
a major contributing factor to the global financial crisis (GFC).
Our Austerians see the solution in belt-tightening, especially
by Western governments. But that tends to slow growth and
boost unemployment, thus increasing the burden of private sec-
tor debt. The idea is that this will reduce government debt and
deficit ratios, but in practice that may not work due to impacts
on the domestic private sector. Tightening the fiscal stance can
occur in conjunction with lowering private sector debts and
deficits only if this somehow reduces current account deficits.
Yet many nations around the world rely on current account sur-
pluses to fuel domestic growth and to keep domestic government
and private sector balance sheets strong. They therefore react to
fiscal tightening by trading partners either by depreciating their
exchange rates or by lowering their costs. In the end, this sets off
a sort of modern mercantilist dynamic that leads to race-to-the-
bottom policies that few Western nations benefit from. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
Germany has specialized in such dynamics and has played its
cards well. It has held the line on nominal wages while greatly
increasing productivity. As a result, it has become a low-cost pro-
ducer in Europe despite its reasonably high living standards.
Given productivity advantages, it can go toe to toe against non-
euro countries in spite of what looks like an overvalued currency.
For Germany, however, the euro is significantly undervalued. The
result is that Germany operates with a current account surplus
that allows its domestic private sector and government to run
deficits that are relatively small. Hence, its overall debt ratio is at
200 percent of GDP—approximately 50 percent of GDP lower
than the eurozone average. 
Not surprisingly, the Godleyan balances identity hit the
periphery nations particularly hard, as they suffer from what is
for them an overvalued euro and lower productivity than Germany
enjoys. With current accounts biased toward deficits, it is not a
surprise to find that the Mediterraneans have bigger government
and private sector debt loads.
If Europe’s center understood balance sheets, it would be
obvious that Germany’s relatively “better” balances rely to some
degree on the periphery’s relatively “worse” balances. If each
country had a separate currency, the solution would be to adjust
exchange rates so that debtor nations would have depreciation
and Germany would have an appreciating currency. Since within
the eurozone this is not possible, the only price adjustment that
could work would be either rising wages and prices in Germany
or falling wages and prices on the periphery. But ECB, Bundesbank,
and EU policy more generally will not allow significant wage and
price inflation in the center. Hence, the only solution is persist-
ent deflationary pressures on the periphery. Those dynamics lead
to slow growth and hence compound the debt burden problems.
We have known since the time of Irving Fisher that defla-
tion imposes tremendous costs. The biggest cost is borne by
debtors, as the real value of their nominally denominated debts
increases. It is for this reason that deflation is a disease to be
avoided. It typically results in debt deflation dynamics, with
debtors forced to default on commitments. Outside of deep
recessions or depressions, price and wage deflation is a rare
event—and an outcome that policy purposely tries to avoid. But
if Germany refuses to inflate, and if Greece and other periphery
nations cannot depreciate their currencies, then debt deflation
dynamics are the only way to avoid increasingly noncompetitive
wages and prices.
Those noncompetitive wages and prices virtually guarantee
current account deficits that, by identity, guarantee rising debt
for the government or the private sector. And if debt grows faster
than GDP, the debt ratio rises. Note that these are statements
informed by identities; they are not meant to be policy state-
ments. But policy cannot avoid identities. Reduction of deficits
and debts in periphery nations requires changes to balances out-
side the periphery. If we want Greece and Ireland to lower debt
ratios, they must change their current account balances. That in
turn requires that some nations reduce their current account sur-
pluses. For example, if Germany would be willing to run large
current account deficits, it would be easier for periphery nations
to reduce domestic deficit spending.
But instead, Europe’s center insists on a combination of
underfunded bailouts and austerity imposed on the periphery.
This is supposed to keep indebted nations in the EMU, on the
belief that with sufficient fiscal rectitude they might become fit
for living within Maastricht guidelines. The problem is that they
are left with too much debt, and at the same time they face
German intransigence to changing the current account dynam-
ics outlined above. Austerity on the periphery will not improve
deficit ratios (of the private and government sectors) unless the
external accounts improve. While there might be some wage and
price level that would allow a Greece or a Portugal to compete
with German productivity, GDP in these nations would be so
depressed that government deficits would likely be worse than
they are today, and default on both government debt and private
debt would be virtually assured. 
Given these dynamics, debt relief, which might take the form
of default, is the only way that Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and per-
haps Spain and Italy can remain within the EMU. But it is not at
all clear that the nuclear option of dissolution can be avoided.
Even the most mainstream commentators are providing analy-
ses of a Euroland divorce, with resolution ranging from a com-
plete breakup to a split between a Teutonic Union embracing
fiscal rectitude with an overvalued currency, and a Latin Union
with a greatly devalued currency. In a recent poll, global investors
put a 72 percent probability on a country leaving the euro within
five years (40 percent think it will occur within a year), and three-
quarters expect a recession in Euroland within the next 12 months.
Global investment strategist PIMCO thinks the recession has
already begun (Kennedy 2011).
A recent report from Credit Suisse dared to ask, What if
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defined PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) abandoning
the euro and each adopting its own currency (Garthwaite et al.
2011)? The report paints a bleak picture. The currencies on the
periphery would depreciate, raising the cost of servicing euro
debt and leading to a cascade of sovereign defaults across highly
indebted euro nations. With the weaker nations gone, the euro
used by the stronger nations would appreciate, hurting their
export sectors. That would increase the pressures for trade wars,
and for a Great Depression “2.0” (the report puts this probabil-
ity at an optimistic 10 percent).
Surveying Some Proposed Solutions
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (2011) comes very close to getting it
right, in our view. The problem, he asserts, is not sovereign euro
debt but “the euro itself”—a “machine for perpetual destruc-
tion,” as he puts it. He rightly points to the competitive gap
between the North and the South, and argues that the euro is
overvalued in the South and undervalued for Germany. He also
points to the German delusion that its trade surpluses are “good”
but the South’s trade deficits are “bad” (obviously, they are
linked). Evans-Pritchard discounts scare talk about the cata-
strophic costs of a breakup and argues that the benefits of a
North-South split could be significant. If the “Latin tier” could
reboot with a significantly devalued (new) currency, it could
become competitive. While our preferred solution is different,
we believe Evans-Pritchard is certainly on the right track, and his
criticism of Euroland’s German center is on target.
One popular but ultimately misguided proposal is to use
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) funding as capital
to create (following the instructive example of US mortgage
securitizers!) a sort of structured investment vehicle (SIV) that
would buy sovereign debt and issue its own bonds, with the
bailout fund serving as equity security. If leveraged, total fund-
ing available to buy trashy government debt could be several tril-
lions of euros. But as we found out during the US crisis in
mortgage-backed securities, leverage is great on the way up but
very painful on the way down. When a crisis hits, the SIV cannot
continue to finance its position, so it must sell assets into declin-
ing markets. If leverage is eight-to-one, its capital is quickly
wiped out by a fairly small reduction (12 percent) in the value of
its assets; problems are reinforced by price reductions that lower
capital and lessen the willingness of lenders to hold the SIV’s debt. 
So this proposal only works if: (a) the SIV buys the assets at
fire-sale prices now, so that (b) the risks of further large price
declines are remote. If the SIV’s own debt is long term, it does not
need to worry about refinancing its position. But that will make
the initial financing more expensive, since the risk is shifted to
creditors. One of the reasons that the American SIVs seemed to
“work” is that they relied on very short-term, and thus cheap,
finance. But of course that permitted a run out of the SIVs as
soon as the crisis hit. In the case of this European proposal, it is
difficult to see why lenders to the SIVs would prefer to get stuck
in bonds that effectively place highly leveraged bets on troubled
assets. Anyone who wants to take a chance on Greek debt can
just go out and buy it. As we now know, diversifying across trashy
subprime mortgages did no good—they were all risky and the
risks were highly correlated, because when real estate prices
stopped rising, the charade ended.
A different solution offered by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von
Weizsäcker (2011) would pool a portion of each member’s gov-
ernment debt—equal to the Maastricht criterion of 60 percent of
GDP. This would be allocated to a “blue bond” classification, with
any debt above that classified as “red bond.” The idea is that the
blue bonds would be low risk, with holders serviced first. Holders
of red bonds would only be paid once the blue bonds were serv-
iced. About half the current EMU members would have quite
small issues of red bonds; about a quarter would not even be
close to their limit on blue bond issues at current debt ratios. 
The proposal draws on the US experiment in tranching
mortgages to produce “safe” triple-A mortgage-backed securi-
ties protected by “overcollateralization,” since the lower-grade
securities supposedly took all the risks. Needless to say, that did
not turn out very well. Delpla and von Weizsäcker’s idea is that
markets will discipline debt issues, since blue bonds will enjoy
low interest rates and red bonds will pay higher rates. Again, the
US experience proves that markets are far too clever for that. If
anything, market discipline delivered precisely the opposite
results. The risks on the lower tranches were underestimated and
vastly underpriced. In a search for yield, financial institutions
held on to a lot of the trash. And the triple-A tranches were much
too big (85 percent of the total pool), meaning they were not
overcollateralized at all. Finally, to increase yield, the lower
tranches were pooled into credit default options (CDOs) with
triple-A tranches, and then the worst of that was used in CDOs-
squared, and so on. And all of this behavior was perfectly aligned
with “market discipline.”Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
This blue bond / red bond proposal is not, however, entirely
without merit. If the full faith and credit of the entire EMU
(including, most critically, that of the ECB) were put behind the
blue bonds, and substantial nonmarket discipline (i.e., regula-
tion) were placed upon the red bonds, the scheme would have
some potential. More important, it directs us toward a real solu-
tion. Our colleagues Yanis Varoufakis and Stuart Holland (2011)
have issued a similar proposal. Briefly, the ECB would buy mem-
ber sovereign debt at a volume of up to 60 percent of a nation’s
GDP. These would be held as eurobonds and nations would con-
tinue to service them, albeit at a lower interest rate to reflect 
the ECB’s lower cost of issuing its own liabilities. By moving so
much debt to the ECB, nations would easily meet the Maastricht
criteria—which would be applied only to the remaining debt
outstanding in markets. The ECB, in turn, could sell eurobonds
to provide liquid and safe euro-denominated debt to markets,
attracting foreign investors, especially central banks and sover-
eign wealth funds. That would help to finance the European
Economic Recovery Programme, with the ECB issuing eurobonds
to provide new funding to the European Investment Bank. Thus,
the authors not only address the current insolvency problems
but also tackle the problem of recovery. Our preferred solution
involves a similar issuance of bonds backed by the ECB.
After the failure to expand the EFSF from the 440 billion euros
to the trillions needed to backstop Italy and Spain, the European
Commission proposed an alternative to allow every eurozone
country to issue eurobonds guaranteed by all 17 member-states,
subject to the Commission’s control of national budgets.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has come out with
its own suggestion to create a fund from which troubled euro-
zone members could borrow. Financing of the fund would be
through  loans  from  the  ECB.  This  would  circumvent  the
Maastricht Treaty’s rules against bailouts and the purchase of
new government bonds. It would, however, entail the IMF’s and
Commission’s control over national budgets and include sanc-
tions for noncompliance. Obviously, the proposals would restrict
governments’ abilities to institute their own tax and spending
policies. The civil disturbances in Athens and other European
cities suggest what could happen if Brussels came to dominate
national economic policies (Feldstein 2011).
Before we begin to outline the way forward in the eurozone,
we look across the pond to the rickety banking system and sput-
tering economic recovery in the United States.
The View from America
The problem with the setup of the EMU was the separation 
of nations from their currencies—as we, along with Charles
Goodhart, Warren Mosler, and Wynne Godley, have long argued.
It is a system that was designed to fail. It would be like a United
States with no Washington, with each state fully responsible not
only for state spending but also for social security, health care,
natural disasters, and bailouts of financial institutions within its
borders. In the United States, all of those responsibilities fall
under the purview of the issuers of the national currency: the
Fed and the Treasury. In truth, the Fed must play a subsidiary
role because, like the ECB, it is prohibited from directly buying
Treasury debt. It can only lend to financial institutions and pur-
chase government debt in the open market. It can help to stabi-
lize the financial system, but it can only lend, not spend, dollars
into existence. The Treasury spends them into existence. When
Congress is not preoccupied with kindergarten-level spats over
debt ceilings, that arrangement works almost tolerably well—a
hurricane in the Gulf leads to Treasury spending to relieve the
pain. A national economic disaster generates a federal budget
deficit of 5 or 10 percent of GDP to counteract recessionary
forces. That cannot happen in Euroland, where the European
Parliament’s budget is less than 1 percent of GDP (approximately
$100 billion). We argued long ago that the first serious Europe-
wide financial crisis would expose the flaws. And it has.
Matters are made much worse because Euroland cannot
turn to its center for help, nor can it rely any longer on the rest
of the world. The economies of the West (at least) are stumbling.
In addition to the residual problems in US real estate, the com-
modities speculative bubble appears to have been pricked. Since
fools rush in on the belief that they can take advantage of sale
prices, the air will not rush out quickly. But with commodities
prices at two, three, and even four standard deviations away from
the mean, the general trend will be downward. That leads to a
vicious cycle of margin calls, which will have knock-on effects as
those with long positions in commodities have to sell out other
asset classes. The stock market will likely be next to falter, and
there are plenty of reasons to sell bank stocks anyway. 
US and European banks are probably already insolvent. If
Greece defaults and the crisis spreads to the periphery, this will
become more obvious. The smaller US banks are in trouble
because of the economic crisis. However, the biggest banks,
which caused the crisis, are still reeling from their mistakes 
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insolvent  when  the  GFC  hit,  and  they  are  still  insolvent.
Policymakers have pursued an “extend and pretend” approach
to hide the insolvencies. However, the sorry state of these banks
will be exposed when the next crisis begins to spread. It is look-
ing increasingly likely that the opening salvo will come from
Europe, although it is certainly possible that it could come from
problems at Bank of America, or Citigroup, or Morgan Stanley. 
Let us look at the reasons to doubt that the “big six” banks
are solvent, and the reasons why it will not take much to push
the United States back into another financial crisis.
(1) The broader economy is struggling.Real estate prices are
not recovering. Few jobs are being created. Defaults and delin-
quencies are not improving. GDP growth is anemic. Household
debt as a percentage of GDP has only declined from 100 percent
to 90 percent. While declining debt ratios are good, it is still too
much debt to service. Total US debt remains about five times
GDP, and while household borrowing has gone negative, debt
loads remain high. Financial institutions are still heavily indebted,
mostly to one another (Wray 2011). Total US debt loads are
much higher than the loads across most of Euroland. This is
especially true if government debt is removed from the equation
(which should be done when talking about the United States,
since it has a sovereign government that issues its own currency).
In comparison, the Europeans are debt pikers. On the one hand,
that is not a fair comparison, because for some of the European
nations (especially Italy), government debt is the problem, and
these are not currency issuers. Instead, they are more like US states,
which are currency users. But the point is that the US private sec-
tor—which is the sector that matters—remains heavily indebted,
while ability to pay has plummeted. “Recovery” of labor markets
remains dismal, by far the worst of the postwar period.
Most of the household debt (almost three-quarters) is linked
to real estate. Twenty-two percent of homeowners, or 10.9 mil-
lion, are underwater on their mortgages, while 1.6 million are
delinquent or in the process of foreclosure (Ablan and Goldstein
2011). Banks still have $700 billion in second lien debt (such as
home equity loans). As these are “sloppy seconds,” much of this
debt is worthless. American consumers account for nearly half of
the global $9 trillion of securitized loans (e.g., mortgage-backed
securities and so on). And there is another $4.1 trillion in mort-
gage debt held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The point is that
there is still a phenomenal amount of debt linked to a declining
US real estate market, and much of that is either directly held by
US financial institutions or will come back to bite them because
of extensive layering of debt across the global financial system.
(2) Not only are financial institutions engaged in very little
traditional commercial banking (lending), they are not doing
much investment banking business either: remember that the
two investment banks remaining in 2008, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley, were handed commercial bank charters so that
they could scoop up insured deposits as a cheap way to finance
their business. How many initial public offerings and corporate
debt issues have been floated? Not much is happening in those
areas. As for trading, in late 2011 Morgan Stanley (today, the
sixth-largest US bank), released a poor trading outlook blamed
on “high costs, historically low interest rates and market volatil-
ity that has pushed clients to the sidelines” (LaCapra 2011). 
(3) Commodities are tanking and equities markets are at
best horizontal. Other than making profits by cooking their
books, these are the main areas open to banks to make profits
since 2008. Both commodities and equities had been doing quite
well, climbing back up from the depths of the crisis. This should
be put in perspective, however, because at best these markets only
recouped losses that were incurred in the crisis. Still, those bub-
bles are now probably over, and losses are going to pile up. It is
true that financial institutions hedge their long positions in com-
modities with some shorts, but with whom do they short?
Remember American International Group, the insurer of first
and last resort: hedges are only as good as counterparties, and
counterparties are no better than you are when markets collapse.
In a crisis, correlations reach 100 percent. All asset classes col-
lapse together because of the heavy layering and margin calls that
force sales of even good assets in portfolios.
(4) Hedge funds have not done particularly well over the
past couple of years, and yet banks have, so that even though
their profits come largely from trading (plus cooking books and
reducing loan loss reserves), the banks are far more successful
than hedge fund managers at picking winners. Does that make a
lot of sense?
(5) And, as mentioned above, banks are facing a number of
lawsuits, which requires hiring lawyers, paying fees and fines, and
employing robo-signers to falsify documents. In other words, it
is costly to continue to fight a growing wave of lawsuits, not only
by homeowners but also by deep-pocketed securities holders like
PIMCO, the New York Fed, and Fannie and Freddie. The threat
of such suits also causes bank stocks to fall, increasing the cost of
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(6) Europe, as we noted above, is on the verge of collapse,
and US bank exposure to Euroland is huge. Indeed, in the fall of
2011 Morgan Stanley was fighting off rumors that it could lose
$30 billion due to exposure to German and French banks (LaCapra
2011). As Robert Reich (2011) correctly argued, although direct
lending by US banks to heavily indebted sovereign European
governments is not high, they have exposure of almost $3 trillion
through links to European banks. If, say, Greece defaults, US
banks get hurt to the extent that European banks default on their
debts. US money market mutual funds are also heavily invested
in  Euroland—about  half  of  their  assets  are  in  short-term
European bank IOUs. 
Note that MMMFs are essentially uninsured deposits that
pretend to be as safe as FDIC-insured deposits, and there are 
$3 trillion worth of them (versus about $6 trillion of insured
deposits). When the GFC hit, there was a run out of MMMFs
that threatened to “break the buck.” They were saved by extension
of the U  S government guarantee, which is now illegal according
to the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. One might say “So what, let them
fail.” But these funds lend to US banks, which need to roll over
short-term paper bought by the MMMFs. Bank finance will dry
up in a run. That is the trouble with layering, and the MMMFs
are an important link in the finance chain. A problem with the
MMMFs is not a two or three standard deviation event. It is a
relatively high probability event that ought to be taken into
account when “stress testing” banks. This is an accident waiting
to happen.
In addition, the Fed has become a lender of last resort for
Euroland (and, indeed, around the globe). To be sure, the Fed
has the ability to create an infinite supply of US dollar reserves
through “keystrokes.”  Its  only  limit  is  self-imposed,  unless
Congress gets involved and tells it to stop.
Paths to Recovery
Where do we go from here? The US has the fiscal capacity to deal
with its problems. Briefly, it needs a three-pronged approach:
(1) Jobs. The best policy would be to follow the New Deal
example, with direct job creation programs along the lines of the
Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation
Corps. If a universal program is not politically feasible, then a
smaller-scale assault could help (recall that President Carter
managed  to  expand  the  Comprehensive  Employment  and
Training Act during the late 1970s stagflation). This could entail
some combination of federal jobs programs plus something like
block grants to states to fund infrastructure and social spending
that would create jobs. We must think big, however. We need
more than 20 million full-time jobs, and the federal government
will have to provide the funding for a significant portion of these. 
(2) Debt relief. The number of homeowners underwater on
their mortgages will continue to grow. Even after falling by 30
percent, house prices in some parts of the country remain too
high. Based on the history of US real estate busts since World
War II (which had always been regional up to this current bust),
it takes many years for prices to rise back to precrisis levels.
Because the speculative bubble took prices to unprecedented
heights, we should not expect that economic “fundamentals” will
justify a return to such prices for a decade or more, and maybe
even a generation in some regions. Since we must learn to live
with lower prices, we must write down the mortgage debt.
To make this fair, it must be done for everyone, not just for
those who default. That will almost of necessity require a big role
for Uncle Sam. Individual banks are not going to do it. We need
an honest assessment of real estate values, following clear guide-
lines, to establish a base for an acceptable mortgage. Let us say
that, on average, houses will be valued at one-third less than 
precrisis  prices. An  acceptable  mortgage  would  then  be  80 
percent of that. The federal government, working either with
government-sponsored enterprises or with private lenders (a
choice will need to be made), would then provide a new mort-
gage on favorable terms (fixed rate, 30 years), used to retire the
outstanding mortgage. Policy will have to be developed to deter-
mine how the losses (the difference between the new mortgage
and outstanding mortgage debt) would be shared among mort-
gage originator, servicer, mortgage-backed security holder, and
the federal government. Some analysts have proposed clever “claw
back” schemes in which creditors can share with homeowners
any capital gains generated as house prices rise. In any event, it
is clear that policy direction must come from Washington, and
that the policy will have to be imposed on creditors. Homeowners
could choose either to participate or to keep current mortgages.
It is important, however, to exclude speculators who bought sev-
eral houses in the boom. Debt relief should only be for owner-
occupied housing.
(3) Resolution of insolvent institutions. We know from the
savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s that the costs of eventual
resolution explode when insolvent banks are kept open by a 
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open and let the same people continue to run it, they have every
incentive  to  pay  themselves  huge  bonuses,  slash  loan  loss
reserves, burn documents, and move as much cash to offshore
havens as they can, because their institution is already bankrupt.
All they have to do is to keep it open and shred evidence until
the statute of limitations runs out. 
That is why these institutions must be resolved. And note
that this is the law: insolvent institutions must be resolved at the
least cost to the FDIC. Unfortunately, more than three years after
the GFC we still have not done that. And if we do pursue a pol-
icy of mortgage relief, with proper accounting of property values
and losses, the insolvencies will be exposed. Note that the debt
relief is more a matter of recognizing reality than one of creating
losses for banks. The existing mortgages do not recognize that
reality, and carrying them on the books at face value just hides it.
The losses already exist. Closing the insolvent institutions is the
only way to end the charade while at the same time reducing
incentives to continue the cover-ups and the fraud. It would also
lead to a stronger financial system, with smaller institutions and
less concentration of economic power. Closing the biggest insol-
vent institutions would admittedly produce some collateral dam-
age—say, losses among pension funds that hold their equities
and uninsured debt—and policymakers would have to deal with
that. Among the greater challenges: the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation would become insolvent and would need a bailout.
As for Euroland, the solutions are more difficult because, as
discussed above (and in several other Levy Institute publica-
tions), these nations do not individually have the fiscal capacity
to deal with their problems. So one solution for a troubled coun-
try is to leave the EMU and return to a sovereign currency issued
by the government—the drachma for Greece, the lira for Italy,
and so on. The transition would be disruptive, with near-term
costs. But the benefit would be to create domestic fiscal and pol-
icy space to deal with the crisis. Default on euro-denominated
debt would be necessary and retaliation by the EU is possible.
However, in our view this is preferable to the “Teutonic vs. Latin”
two-currency scheme discussed above by Evans-Pritchard, which
would simply tie, say, Greece to another external currency. It
would have no more fiscal or monetary policy space than it has
now, albeit with a currency that would be devalued relative to
the euro.
If dissolution is not chosen, then the only real solution is to
reformulate the EMU. Many critics of the EMU have long blamed
the ECB for sluggish growth, especially on the periphery. The
argument is that the central bank kept interest rates too high for
full employment to be achieved. We have always thought that
was wrong—not because lower interest rates are undesirable, but
because even with the best run central bank, the real problem in
the setup was fiscal policy constraints. Indeed, the authors of a
2005 Levy Institute Working Paper demonstrated that the ECB’s
policy was not significantly tighter than the Federal Reserve’s,
but US economic performance was consistently better. The dif-
ference was fiscal policy, with Washington commanding a budget
that was more than 20 percent of GDP, and usually running 
a budget deficit of several percent of GDP. By contrast, the
European Parliament’s budget was less than 1 percent of GDP.
(See Sardoni and Wray 2005.)
The problem was that, as deficits and debt rose, markets
reacted by increasing interest rates, recognizing that, unlike a sov-
ereign country like the United States, Japan, or the UK, EMU
members were users of an external currency. As we said above,
they were more like a US state. On the one hand, they could run
much bigger deficits than US states (all but two of which are con-
strained by constitutions to balance their budgets), in part due to
the expectation that if things went bad, the ECB would probably
help their state central banks. But on the other hand, US states
had Washington to provide fiscal relief—something EMU mem-
bers did not have. At best, they could borrow euros from European
institutions or from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But
borrowing would just increase interest rates, potentially leading
to a vicious debt trap. To some extent, America avoided this trap,
as markets force balanced budgets on states and Washington
eased the pain with fiscal transfers. As a result, a larger percent-
age of EMU national deficits went to interest payments, which
may not be the best stimulus as much leaks out to foreign hold-
ers of the debt. 
Once the EMU weakness is understood, it is not hard to see
the solutions. They include ramping up the fiscal policy space of
the European Parliament—for instance, by increasing its budget
to 15 percent of GDP, with a capacity to issue debt. Whether the
spending decisions should be centralized is a political matter.
Funds could simply be transferred to individual states on a per
capita basis. 
ECB rules could also be changed to allow it to buy, say, an
amount equal to a maximum of 6 percent of Euroland GDP each
year in the form of government debt issued by EMU members.
As a buyer, it can set the interest rate. It might be best to mandate
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the target. Again, the allocation would be on a per capita basis
across the member-states. Note that this is similar to the blue
bond / red bond proposal discussed above. Individual members
could continue to issue bonds to markets, so they could exceed the
debt issue that is bought by the ECB, much as US states issue bonds.
One can conceive of variations on this theme, such as the
creation of some EMU-wide funding authority backed by the
ECB that issues debt to buy government debt from individual
nations—again, along the lines of the blue bond proposal. What
is essential, however, is that the backing comes from the center:
the ECB or the EU stands behind the debt. That will keep inter-
est rates low, removing “market discipline” and vicious debt
cycles due to exploding interest rates. With lending spread across
nations based on some formula (e.g., per capita), every member
should get the same interest rate. 
All of these are technically simple and economically sound
proposals. They are, however, admittedly difficult politically. But
the  longer  the  EU  waits,  the  more  difficult  these  solutions
become. Crises only increase the forces of disunity and dissolu-
tion, increasing the likelihood of eventual divorce and hostility,
which in turn forestalls a real solution and makes a new Great
Depression—a combination of a downturn plus Fisher debt
deflation dynamics—ever more probable.
Conclusion: A Greek Endgame for the Euro? 
The grand experiment of a unified Europe with a common cur-
rency has entered its endgame. If the current trajectory contin-
ues, the disintegration of the euro is inevitable. Athens is, of
course, at the center of the vortex. The “rescue” plan accepted by
Greece certainly will not save the system, and it will not save
Greece from a sovereign default. The bailout conditions demanded
by the troika that holds the purse strings—the IMF, the ECB, and
the EU—are unworkable. The latest package, recently approved
by the Greek Parliament, offers 130 billion euros in return for
more of the same crippling austerity measures. It is a neoliberal
fantasy, including a 22 percent reduction in the minimum wage,
deep pension cuts, and layoffs of 150,000 public workers. The
troika can barely expect these latest austerity measures to be
adhered to, as they stretch the limits of what will be tolerated by
a nation already experiencing severe social tensions. If fully
enacted, these growth-killing measures threaten to push Greece
out of the eurozone.
Despite a climate of denial, a complete default is a real pos-
sibility. As the results cascade across the continent, credit ratings,
interest  rates,  and  the  political  fallout  will  quickly  become
unworkable, for both stronger nations and weaker ones. Our
view is that even though they know very well that Greece’s sov-
ereign debt problem is a solvency issue and not a liquidity prob-
lem, Europe’s leaders pretend and forcibly argue that it can be
solved with these rescue packages, and only if Greece can carry
out its promised reforms. But regardless of the success or failure
of the harsh austerity measures, the country’s debt level is
increasing, while the European financial system remains at risk
and will, in all likelihood, occasion the unraveling of the euro
project. The consequences will undoubtedly be catastrophic for
the eurozone member-states that are highly indebted (Italy,
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and Portugal). But they will also
be  devastating  for  the  surplus-producing  states,  especially
Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states, which
are highly dependent on their export-directed economies enjoy-
ing the exchange rate stability the euro provides. And then there
is the contagion effect once Greece’s insolvency is “officially” rec-
ognized, spilling over to Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, and
possibly to the global economy.
For a society like Greece with flagrant tax avoidance and
evasion, together with a high degree of transaction opacity, the
ongoing harsh measures and reforms that are being implemented
have proven to be ineffective, exacerbating tax evasion, growing
the shadow economy, and slowly but steadily causing the disap-
pearance of the middle class. Vulnerable segments of the popu-
lation are being pushed deeper into poverty and despair while
the privileged benefit disproportionately. All of this has combined
to make Greece one of the most unequal countries in Europe.
The demands of the troika have been devastating for the
Greek population, and under terms of the latest bailout package,
matters will only worsen. In 2011, the decline in GDP was 6.9
percent (EL-STAT 2012). Unemployment has risen to over 20
percent overall, and in some provinces it has hit the 50 percent
mark. Youth unemployment is over 52 percent (Antonopoulos,
Papadimitriou, and Toay 2011). Negative social and economic
trends are already emerging, with homelessness and crime accel-
erating rapidly. Combined with dangerous anti-immigrant sen-
timents (immigrants make up about 7 percent of the Greek
population) and shifts toward the extreme right, such trends
threaten to wreak havoc, dismantle social cohesion, and destabi-
lize the nation.Public Policy Brief, No. 122 14
Given the unprecedented and extraordinarily high levels of
Greek bond yields, markets and investors have concluded that
Greece will sooner or later default on its debt, whether in an
orderly or a disorderly fashion. It is no surprise, then, that they
would want a clearly worked-out plan that isolates Greece from
the rest of the eurozone. But this is not possible, as demonstrated
by the troubles of the Franco-Belgian lender Dexia and the ECB’s
recent wave of loans to European banks. Greece’s sovereign debt
problem is not limited to Greek lenders. It affects the entire euro-
zone, requiring a eurozone-wide solution.
The  immediate  problem  could  be  resolved  if  the  ECB
announced that it was ready and willing to purchase all out-
standing Greek bonds at market prices. The result would be a
dramatic drop in yields and increases in Greek bond prices. The
ECB’s message would quickly calm the financial turbulence and
solve the eurozone markets’ volatility problem until a permanent
solution could be crafted.
The absence of this bold approach opens the possibility of
an orderly default. Greece would most likely continue to receive
structural funding support from the EU for development pur-
poses, but it would be required to continue the implementation
of even harsher austerity measures and reforms. The structural
deficit would eventually be brought under control, but at the
expense of an unemployment rate even higher than the current
socially disastrous level of 20 percent. The EU/ECB/IMF-imposed
measures  would  achieve  the  goal  of  deficit  reduction  with
unprecedented numbers of unemployed, severely unequal dis-
tribution of income and wealth, and a country highly dependent
on the European powers.
This is not the only possible endgame. Greece’s exit from the
euro has been presented as another option for dealing with the
country’s insolvency, but it would entail significant risks that are
difficult to ascertain. An exit would cause market upheaval to
reverberate throughout the global economy, at least for some
period of time, pushing other eurozone countries to follow suit
and with serious consequences for Greece. In this scenario, we
should expect an immediate devaluation of the national cur-
rency, a default on the country’s debt, inflationary pressures, and
runs on Greek banks (and their nationalization), together with
perilous economic and societal trends characteristic of a dys-
functional economy. It is possible, however, that after a period
of dramatic hardship, the country could reestablish itself as a
viable economy highly dependent on a spectacular leader show-
ing the way. 
In sum, the collapse of the euro project will break in one of
two ways. Looking increasingly likely, and least desirable, is that
nations will leave the euro in a coordinated dissolution, which
might ideally resemble an amicable divorce. As with most divorces,
it would leave all the participants financially worse off. Wealthier
countries would be back to the kinds of tariffs, transaction costs,
and immobile labor and capital that inspired the euro in the first
place. Poorer nations could kiss their subsidies, explicit and
implicit, good-bye. 
Less likely, but more desirable, would be a major economic
restructuring leading toward increased European consolidation.
Thus far, the real beneficiaries of the EU bailouts have been the
banks that hold all the debt. But with some restructuring and
alteration of regulations, that would not need to be the case. The
doomed rescue plans we are seeing do not address the central
problem: countries with very different economies are yoked to
the same currency. Nations like Greece are not positioned to
compete with countries that are more productive, like Germany,
or that have lower production costs, like Latvia. Any workable
plan to save the euro has to address those differences. 
The best structural changes would even out trade imbal-
ances by “refluxing” the surpluses of countries such as Germany,
France, and the Netherlands into deficit countries by, for exam-
ple, investing euros in them. Germany did this with the former
East Germany following reunification. This kind of mechanism
could be set up very quickly under the EFSF if it had a deeper
well to draw from, probably one trillion euros. 
The European Parliament, led by its premier leaders, Angela
Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, could authorize the EFSF to take
over the entire sovereign debt of the expanding periphery, which,
in addition to Greece, would include Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
and possibly Italy. Ideally, the EFSF would ultimately be respon-
sible to the (elected) Parliament. The arrangement would repli-
cate, in some ways, the US Treasury’s relationship with the states,
but with more control by Europe’s nations. Yes, the European
Parliament has long engaged in payments to poorer nations, but
its total budget has remained below 1 percent of GDP, which is
clearly too small.
It is possible that the EU will eventually take this path, or a
similar one, in recognition of the value of the eurozone. The 
current approach is unsustainable, with French and German 
taxpayers furious about footing the bill and residents in the
peripheral nations angrily resisting cutbacks. It is remarkable
that Merkel has not already recognized that Germany, as the EU’sLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
largest net exporter, is facing a losing proposition by insisting on
fiscal austerity for its many troubled neighbors. 
The founding of the EU was a political venture that emerged
from the ambitious heads of the two leading continental powers,
Germany and France. Their creation grew into a promising eco-
nomic laboratory. The absence of a true political union—an
entity with a unified fiscal policy as well as a unified currency—
might be the cause of its death. The fallout from a European
crash would be significant. Indeed, we believe that due to the
interconnectedness of global finance, a financial crash in any
region is likely to set off a second installment of the GFC. The
spark could originate in Europe, the United States, or even Asia
or the BRICs. While we do believe there are benefits to unifica-
tion in Europe and to the greater integration of all economies
around the globe, there is also the danger that overleveraged
global financial capitalism could cause a crisis in one area to
quickly degenerate into a global panic.
What we have today is, in Minsky’s terms, money manager
capitalism. What we need is a different form of what he called
the “57 varieties of capitalism.” The current one is simply too
fragile to be sustained. While the problems in Euroland are some-
what idiosyncratic—a unified currency without unified fiscal
policy—Europe also shares with the Anglo economies the typi-
cal money manager characteristics: too much debt, too much
layering and leveraging, and too much power concentrated in
the hands of a few institutions. The greatest barrier to a resolu-
tion in Europe is the fear among leaders that reform will harm
the biggest banks. Both Europe and the Anglo nations, as well as
Iceland, need debt relief and downsizing of the role played by
finance. But the very power that finance has managed to assume
makes real solutions politically infeasible. It may take the total
collapse of money manager capitalism before a real solution can
be brought forward.
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